A Review of literature on Social Capital

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The legitimate object of government, is to do for a community of people whatever they need to have done, but can not do, at all, or can not, so well do, for themselves– in their separate, and individual capacities.

Abraham Lincoln, 1854? (Emphasis his)

Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence.

James Coleman 1988:302

Introduction

There is a remarkable similarity between these two quotes, but an important difference as well. The difference is that Lincoln’s notion of government can replace social capital in Coleman’s formulation, but social capital cannot replace government in Lincoln’s. The reason for this is that social capital is reification and ambiguous at that -while government is the word

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we give to a system of meaning and behavior. In other words scholar create the idea of social
capital creation, claiming for it the general application and utility of government, but without the
system of meaning and behavior that practitioners and scholars of government expect, observe
and tinker with. The difference is subtle, but important – though the idea of government is
abstract it is not needlessly so and more importantly is circumscribed by law and social
convention. Furthermore, the system of meaning and behavior we call government has the
quality of orienting diverse, even opposing, expectations around shareable activities. Social
Capital has that quality only if scholars say so.

We find Lincoln and Coleman thinking about social relationships and about the
fulfillment of ends, collective and individual. But the two comprehend very different means for
realizing relationships that produce desirable ends or needs. On the one hand Lincoln links
people to needs by way of organization, on the other, there is an implied linkage between people
and ends by way of an idea. Government is relatively concrete, social capital amorphous, and
both government and social capital have been held up as a beacon by some and roundly
criticized by others. The review to follow considers government, among other human activities,
but focuses on social capital and finds it mostly wanting as a tool for theory or for policy.
Whatever the problems of government or other concrete forms of human organization it is easier
to answer questions about the fulfillment of ends when considering actual relationships in social
organizational context instead of asserting that social capital is an adequate stand-in for less
abstract ideas that relate behavior, organization, and ideas, and thus serve to link the
understanding of a social setting/activities to policy programs.

Cooperative efforts to improve society, efforts that span organizational contexts, are in
great demand as are cost effective ways to address social problems. New ideas, with great promise, can do a scholar’s career good, even if incompletely thought out; and being on the cutting edge can cut to one’s advantage so, as a result, a number of researchers and practitioners found the idea of social capital friendly to their theoretical and research interests and policy concerns. Conceptual and empirical work done with social capital has provided much to consider in the philanthropic community. The following review is responsive to this context of research and policy practice as well as to the needs of funding agencies and policy makers who need the idea assessed.

The review proceeds in the following way; first, I will begin by discussing some overall trends in what has been published about social capital, including parts describing different formulations of the idea, empirical research with it and reviews of it from a number of disciplinary perspectives. In the second section I will attend briefly to one of the conflicts in theory and the implications of some congruence in discussions of research methodology. In the third section, based on the implications of the first two sections, I will point up a policy idea of potential use for human development.

I. Trends in Social Capital Research

There is interest in determining how social capital applies to understanding or ameliorating a wide variety of social problems as well as seeking applications for the idea in research on business. In the 1970s and 1980s social capital was implied in empirical work on ethnic entrepreneurship and mobility (Lin) and health (James et al discuss these antecedents),
then made explicit in work projects on public goods and collective action (Coleman), and the reproduction of inequality (Loury; Bourdieu). In the early 1990s the notion was used explicitly (even if problematically) in work, participation in civil society (Putnam), network analysis, (Astone; Lin), and finally questioned strongly by Baron and Hannan. Though the term is only about 25 years old, it has a robust history. It has been used by prominent figures in the social sciences for empirical research in a number of disciplines and sub disciplines. Scientists, primarily sociologist, have engaged in social capital research on public health, education, and economic development, among others. Researchers also rely on social capital to address topics such as institutional design (Lownes and Wilson), the possible decline of civic engagement (Putnam, Paxton), community and crime (Sampson, et al), and ethnic entrepreneurship (Sanders and Nee). Nonetheless, it has few strong proponents and a growing number of detractors; recently it has gone under intense critique from authors in many fields. The following three parts of this section correspond to this trajectory, beginning by discussing some formulations and a response to the idea, followed by a review of empirical work and a discussion of some of the many review articles on the topic.

A.

In James Coleman’s magnum opus (1988) social capital figures prominently and his discussion relies on his understanding of the development of social theory, and in particular how to understand social action. He writes of two streams of thought on action, as socialized, constrained by context, or as rational or purposive. He rejects the dichotomy arguing that social
capital embraces both, being the creation of purposive actors in social relationships and then learned and mobilized by actors from the resultant structure on behalf of many and diverse goals.

Coleman writes that social capital is constituted by social organizations. Different social organization do different things, for instance, facilitate transactions, act to ensure transactions and perhaps be appropriated by other actors for different purposes. Social capital is the obligations and expectations produced by involvement in social organizations. Involvement changes relations between people and those relations facilitate action, “that make possible the achievement of further ends that would not be attainable in its absence.” (1990:302). So, for Coleman social capital is in the structure of relations, and is found and used by individuals in that structure.

Metaphorically, social capital is a “power” that enables people to do things they are otherwise unable to do, his definition is functional, social capital is what it does, but it is also ambiguous. Social capital is found in “social structure” and it enables by providing trust, reconciling expectations and providing for mutual and reciprocal obligations in ongoing relationships. His primary examples are of obligation and trust between individuals in various settings; he extrapolates the idea to explain how collective action problems are solved by establishing reciprocal expectations and trustworthiness and disseminating the information to other actors. There are a variety of problems with Coleman’s formulation and many will be discussed below; but the most obvious and telling for me is how his use occludes ideas/behaviors in practice, substituting an overly abstract notion of social capital for understanding how trust and mutual obligation and whatnot emerge from different activities, goal oriented and otherwise.

For Pierre Bourdieu, (1985), social capital is “the aggregate of actual or potential
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition.” His is an instrumental focus on the growth of inequality of resources and outcomes that result from the deliberate construction of social groups and boundaries on participation therein. Bourdieu’s use of social capital is with respect to social networks, which are the product and subject of investment strategies, making successful an adopted strategy can transform contingent relationships into relationships that imply ‘durable obligations, subjectively felt.’ (Forms of Capital 249). Resources follow obligations, as long as they are important enough to feel.

In short Bourdieu, like Coleman assumes goal directed behavior but he goes further to assume that one goal is to reproduce class privilege. Thus Bourdieu’s is a purposeful focus on power and inequality in particular contexts. For him inequality is the willfully unequal distribution (and reproduction of the distribution) of the resources of social capital between social classes. Though Bourdieu never produced a comprehensive discussion of social capital, his emphasis on power and inequality lives on to inspire work critical of Coleman and his inheritors formulations. One important inheritor of Coleman is Robert Putnam.

Putnam’s work is based on Coleman’s and is widely reported and discussed and my summary will be brief. He is known for the contention that social capital is in decline. Putnam (1995) understood social capital as a quality of civic engagement, networks, norms and trust that enable effective action in pursuit of shared objectives. But he is interested in collective action and individual behavior. In other work he discusses social capital in terms of the density of membership in civic associations, survey measures of interpersonal trust and attitudes toward mutual aid. He is primarily interested in aggregate measures of social capital, at the level of the
nation, state or city and his primary evidence are survey measures.

These writings were all developed over the last 10 years or so (earlier for Bourdieu), but in the midst of this work began to grow criticisms of “capital” talk generally and social capital in particular. Baron and Hannan initiated this stream of thought in 1994 and it is worth considering their work here. In a long review article they discussed the impact of economics on sociology and I will focus on one section, “A Plethora of Capitals” (1122-24), from the paper. They note that among economic theories in sociology human capital theory may be the most influential. It’s key insight is that “schooling, health and other behaviors can be thought of in investment terms, thereby calling attention to rates of return (and thus the life cycle), opportunity costs, funding of investments (capital constraints), and the ability of the investor to appropriate the returns from the investment.” For reasons they discuss earlier in the essay they note that many sociologists eschew economists’ formalism or specificity, and instead “use the idea of human capital to talk about the value of personal characteristics in labor markets without always specifying any structure of investment or depreciation.” In their view everything important and problematic about educational processes is reduced to a label “human capital effects” despite the fact that we know there are many competing accounts for the career consequences of education.

On this example they go on to sarcastically describe a “minor industry which has grown to provide sociological parallels to human capital.” They suggest that this “industry” is the sociologists’ response to economist’s charge to invent or discover a form of capital for each kind of social behavior. Baron and Hannan somewhat caustically note that creating concepts, in this case defining classes of capital, is easy for sociologists. They cite Bourdieu as an example of the creation of someone who created many labels for behavior that included the word “capital.” But
they also cite DiMaggio’s warning of such proliferation, “capital becomes less a potent and precise tool than a weak figure of speech. The capitals proliferate.” Baron and Hannan are aware of but puzzled by the increase in capital talk given that “sociologists react against the voluntaristic supply-side focus of human capital, rejecting the imagery of investment, believing instead that class advantages are systematically reproduced.” They would rather we limit our use of “capital” talk to “characteristic(s) regarded as an investment for which there is a capital market and opportunity cost,” and baring this, they “fail to see the value of calling [the characteristic] a type of capital.” They conclude skeptical of capital talk, of the kinds exemplified by Coleman in particular, writing, “To the extent that individuals pick up characteristics from upbringing or normal interaction (ideas of trust and obligation for instance), involving little or no investment for them or parents, we cannot see what good it is to call these outcomes social or cultural capital.” So, in other words, the problems Coleman is interested in his discussion, trust, obligations, collective action, those problems are best labeled simply, as elements of the social processes that they comprise, processes which generate or erode trust, the ability to act collectively or whatever. Interposing additional concepts or creating new concepts eventually confuses matters (see also the discussion in Tamanaha 1997 chapter 2).

For me, social capital is a concept that confuses matters. It confuses how we understand with what we want. We know social relations are constituted by both ideas and interests, both are aspects of institutional processes but modified by individuals experience and goals as well as by what they anticipate and the other activities they pursue in day-to-day life. In response to these authors I ask, why can’t people do whatever it is that social capital supposedly enables them to do? What is it about the social organization of some situations that makes for higher
transaction costs? Perhaps other people’s power inhibits action? Perhaps existing habits? Perhaps people believe that their interests/plans are served sufficiently by the existing social organization? To uncover the salience of any of these answers requires an understanding of the situatedness of observed ideas/behavior, and the relationship between observed ideas/behavior in practice with the broader institutions. Or put differently, we need to understand how existing ideas-in-practice are modified and practiced by people according to their purposes and situations.

Secondly, trustworthiness is key to Coleman, and both Bourdieu and Coleman focus on what they call the ‘actual extent of obligations held.’ This latter formulation focuses on what is rather than on what people might imagine could be and so it fails to recognize the possibilities people have and are interested in realizing. Overmuch focus on the “actual extent” inhibits analysts from understanding how people are changing themselves or the relationships in order to broaden or craft that “extent” in the service of their desire to confront the present. These observations are of the role of context in understanding behavior, in that regard they are not particularly novel, (as will be seen from critics discussed below), but here my contribution is to make more explicit the link between context and people by way of tracing the reciprocal relationship between ideas and behavior, between action and institution.

Coleman and Bourdieu both refer to social networks in their discussions of social capital but neither develops the insights of network analysis as a tool of theory or as a way for us to understand how social capital relates other ways of organizing social life (Powell 1990 reminds us that network models of organization are distinct from market and hierarchy; Wellman and Berkowitz 1988 celebrate network analysis as a distinct tool of theory). For Coleman social capital is the power to do something, for Bourdieu it represents power over something (Smith
For him social capital flows in networks to address the question “the power to do what?”

Lin (1999) is a noted analyst of social networks and how actors (individuals or organizations) mobilize resources in their social networks to achieve certain goals. Lin sets out to build a network theory of social capital. For him social capital is mined from embedded resources in social networks, and then invested in social relations with expected returns. These embedded resources have a variety of uses, similar to those described by Coleman, they facilitate the flow of information and serve to alert people about other people or organizations, second, the ties may influence agents behavior (more so due to location i.e. in Structural Holes, Burt 1992) and third, ties can certify social credentials, reinforcing (fourth) identity and recognition. Later he says social capital is ‘investment in social relations by individuals through which they gain access to embedded resources,’ (1999).

Lin’s work is compatible with Coleman’s, but Lin is less interested in collective action problems then with the social processes that produce inequality. His interest is in the question why, given equivalent embedded resources, do some people mobilize better resources than others? Different network analysts give different answers, perhaps some people are in better network locations or perhaps because some are more aware of the advantage of using better resources. Lin’s answer is that an actor’s position in a hierarchy makes the difference. In short, Lin’s work on social capital, buttressed by Astone et.al., discussed later, is the most in keeping with the economic roots of “capital” talk as introduced by economists like Schulz and Becker and highlighted by Baron and Hannan above.

Users of social capital self select into one of three types, network analysts, followers of
Coleman and Putnam or believers in Bourdieu’s critical approach. But the discussion or debate of the term is more complex, ranging from acceptance of some theoretical position, to outright rejection of the term as a tool for analysis. Criticisms are far ranging but a few recur:

- Do we need the term “social capital” or does it impede investigation;
- what is the definition of social capital and need we agree on one;
- what is the appropriate unit of analysis, individual or group or network?

Despite the conceptual difficulties and disagreements much empirical work has been done with the idea of social capital, some it following the theoretical leads these authors have provided. I will now turn to some of that work.

B.

Many researchers in health, urban and community affairs and the social sciences generally embraced social capital and applications swiftly emerged in education, crime, organizational design, organizational decision-making and most recently “institutional” design, by which authors mean the articulation of government and civil society. Due to the ambiguity of the idea we should not be surprised that relatively few scholars celebrated using it, but use it they did, often skirting questions of ambiguity in definition and operationalization or ignoring published critiques of the idea. Here my purpose is to give some idea of the topical breadth of work done with social capital, (but mostly work done by sociologists), and some of the problems faced and ignored, or overcome, in working with the idea.

Education is a key to status attainment and economic mobility and social capital is seen as a tool to educational achievement (and later occupational attainment, Lin). Stanton-Salazar and Dornbusch (1995) have it that educationally based status attainment is not so much anchored
to available role models or the cheerleading of others as it is in the difficult job of establishing relationships with people who will be sources of information, potential cheerleaders and role models. They make this case on the insights of network analysts, particularly Barry Wellman who sees the effects of social structure on establishing relationships, the pattern of relationships formed and how those relationships facilitate or restrict opportunities to form, maintain (or develop) new ties for different purposes.

They worked with Mexican American high school students in California public schools. Primarily Anglo teachers and counselors served those students, and before they could establish new relationships with these Anglo professionals they had to contend with existing or possible embarrassment, rejection, or social or other debt, in existing relationships. Besides contending with existing relationships, students interested in or considering approaching counselors or other potential mentors also had to overcome distrust and social distance from these professionals. Stanton-Salazar and Dornbusch suggest that these Mexican origin youth lack social capital, understood as relationships from which one derives institutional support. Due to lower social status Mexican origin youth lack the willingness to seek out and interact with people who represent institutional ties and resources, which results in lower expectations for future (Macleod 1987), and institutional agents use this information, as demonstrated by the student in dress, behavior etc. to invest themselves differentially in students (Farkas et al 1990).

In survey research they found that social capital, relationships from which a student can get institutional support, vary with the student’s grades and expectations for their future, but few of their hypotheses were supported. Instead of a relationship between social capital and institutional support, they found a stronger relationship between bilingualism and support from
institutional actors. In a methodological appendix they discussed the problem of measuring social capital and in particular, criticizing the conception they used (based on work by Lin) indicating how social capital, understood as institutional resources, is confounded with social class. In other words, since many middle class youth have parents who qualify as institutional agents, with access to associated resources, how can we differentiate the effects of parents’ occupation or status from social capital? We cannot, social capital complicates rather than clarifies and they have no solution for this problem.

In another study of education, Teachman, Paasch and Carver (1997) investigated the effect of social capital on the generation of human capital. These authors rely on Coleman’s work (1988) to argue that social capital should be used to explain the effect of social context. They use existing survey data (the NELS) to investigate the impact of social, financial and human on the creation of human capital. Their main dependent variable is years of education. Years of education has much unaccounted variation, parents income and parents education account for less than half the variation in the number of years of education an individual acquires, what other variables might be used?

Social capital represents the resources in function specific relationships that account for this unaccounted variation. They find that social capital is important in school continuation, especially when it is accompanied by financial and human capital, but social capital was not central to understanding why some students’ stay in school and others drop out. Private, Catholic school, and family structure provide the strongest account, but, they also note that the survey they analyzed was not designed to understand social capital. Furthermore, social capital is a variable with both direct and indirect effects, and like Stanton-Salazar and Dornbusch, the
relationships they measured were inconsistent and weak.

These studies of education share similar problems. They are ambiguous about what social capital is, what role it plays and how it is measured. These very questions plague most of the empirical work to follow. The work of both projects highlights Baron and Hannan’s concern with what it is we call social capital, it complicates instead of clarifies matters to call the personal characteristics students need, social capital. Clearly relationships and resources, of children, parents and schools are all vital to success, but to label these as social capital does not help us better understand problems in education. I will now turn to two streams of research where two very different measures of social capital are linked to desirable outcomes, the level of neighborhood crime and social control and with respect to reducing the costs of hiring and training employees.

In some oft-cited research crime is taken to be the absence of social capital and social control. Crime varies neighborhood to neighborhood and Sampson and Raudenbush (1997) investigated the relationship between social capital and social control, and related a measure of both (collective efficacy) to the level of violent crime in neighborhoods. They restricted the idea of social capital to interpersonal trust and they measured it and informal social control with a sophisticated survey of individuals living in neighborhoods with different levels of crime. They combined the two ideas, social capital and informal social control into the idea of collective efficacy. The idea being that social capital, trust, alone is insufficient to understand variation in neighborhood levels of crime. Trust, in combination with a willingness to act, provides a more complete understanding of neighborhood variation in criminal behavior.

What accounts for neighborhood differences in levels of trust and willingness to engage
in informal social control? Collective efficacy and neighborhoods with little concentrated poverty, few new immigrants and relatively stable residents. In short, Sampson and colleagues recognized that whatever social capital by itself, is insufficient to understand or solve social problems. Sampson’s work is skeptical of social capital as a sole or even primary explanation for behavior. In Sampson’s hands (among others) social capital feels like a heuristic device that guides investigation instead of as a firmly grasped tool of method or theory. However, there is research in which social capital is central to the research and specified by researchers who are working in response to Baron and Hannan’s challenge discussed above.

There are several studies, often citing Lin’s work, interested in questions of employment and organizational decision-making. The most interesting of these is the one most responsive to criticisms of social capital and that is the work of Fernandez, Castilla and Moore (2000). These authors respond to the challenge that social capital is first capital and should be subject to economic analysis of cost/benefit, return on investment, etc. They are critical of the notion of social capital, citing Baron and Hannan 1994, plethora of capitals, arguing “If the term social capital is to mean anything more than “networks have value” then analysts must be able to identify value of investment, rate of return, and means by which returns are realized.” In short in this work these authors see social capital as valuable networks but by working within the tradition of network analysis they expect to specify the amount of value and conditions that make networks valuable to employer and employee.

Fernandez and colleagues did research in a call center focusing on how social capital counts in firm employment practices, specifically how social capital, expressed as social networks, lowers the costs of recruitment to a firm. What are the processes at work on the
employer side of job matching process? They found that employers realize benefits five
different ways from using existing employees networks, first, existing employees expand the
pool of applicants, second, by way of homophily, that is potential employees have similarity to
existing employees, third, by way of reputation protection, existing employees protect their
reputation in the firm by only referring applicants they think will make good employees; fourth,
information about applicants learned through existing employees is important and saves recruiter
and applicant time; and fifth, as a result, the new hire is a better hire in the sense that they are
longer lived and so reduce costs associated with recruitment, training, and etc. In short,
recruiting on the basis of existing employees social capital reduced costs to the firm.

They see employers as “social capitalists,” who invest in and use employee’s networks to
reduce the costs of recruitment and training. Employers at the call center they studied paid
employees for successful referrals and so “invest the firm” in the quality of particular
employee’s networks. They use company data to identify referral costs, calculate rates of return
and partition the returns as economic benefits to the firm produced by the various mechanisms.
Other network analysis is not so explicit or detailed in the analysis. In contrast to the network
analysis of French business elites by Frank and Yasamoto (1998), Fernandez et al are able to
establish the value of social capital in a network. Other work done with sophisticated network
methods is by Burt (1992) who suggests that position in a network is vitally important to how an
employee might use or mediate the flow of social capital in a firm. All this work is in terms of
organization design and decision science, but is most saliently focused by Fernandez and his
colleagues whose work suggests how managers can craft investment strategies to become sharp
traders in employees networks and social capital. Now the question becomes, if profit oriented
organizations can benefit from social capital, can government and/or nonprofit organizations do so as well?

The researchers above are focused mostly on addressing organizational dilemmas or social problems by way of individuals in their interpersonal relationships but recently researchers have turned to social capital, as it might be understood as an element of institutional or organizational design to foster outcomes desired in society.

Schneider and colleagues (1997) were concerned with how institutional arrangements could foster the creation of social capital. They allow that there may be a general decline in social capital, but they ask instead, “How do institutional arrangements affect the emergence, use, development, and growth of social capital?” They suggest that government’s can design incentives to increase social capital by getting people to engage in “desirable” activities. They were writing in response to Fukuyama who sees government as the primary reason for diminishing social capital. They interviewed parents in an educational setting around issues of school choice? They find that government policy can provide incentives for parents to be more involved by giving them choice.

They cite Fukuyama “The ability to cooperate socially is dependent on prior…” * This is insufficient, for it also depends on the purposes being pursued. This harkens back to how ideas/behavior are shaped by personal interest, participation in organizations and the context both are in. Schneider et al are interested in the role of face-to-face interaction and network formation on involvement in decision-making. This is in distinct contrast to those who see choice as founded mostly on interest group conflict. In their view they see a ratcheting effect, increasing involvement and interpersonal trust (social capital), by providing for school choice.
Being able to choose a school can increase involvement in the school, which they assume is a good thing on the balance. They set up a quasi-experimental design, they surveyed people who make school choices and they found that when given a choice, those people also are higher on other SC variables like involvement in the PTA, volunteering and trusting.

Lowndes and Wilson (2001) are among the most recent writing on the question of social capital and local governance. They take the Coleman/Putnam approach, saying that social capital is the capacity for trust, reciprocity and co-operation. But, we want more than capacity, we want to see efficacious behavior. How might civic-minded government actors enable and support or disable and frustrate citizens? What designs might express government’s civic mindedness? How might such influence the formation of social capital? They suggest that governments can shape the growth of social capital and in so doing improve the chances for desirable behavior. The way governments can do this is by institutional design (government shapes financial capital also, but by different mechanisms). This is the process by which government sets the conditions in which non-governmental organizations operate. Government is in effect a source of ideas/behaviors realized through regulation, incentive or other tools, to which people respond. This is a departure from Putnam’s view of government, he sees institutions as static, rather than as the dynamic sets of ideas and behaviors that are responsive to internal and external stimuli. This article is largely conceptual...*

From their empirical observations they suggest there are four interacting dimensions of institutional design that constrain, obligate and empower relationships within the voluntary sector. These four are nothing new to researchers, they are: opportunities for public participation, responsiveness of decision-making and arrangements for democratic leadership
and social inclusion.

Recent empirical work on the subject of state/society partnerships is found in Australia and the United Kingdom. In this work (Whittaker and Banwell, 2002; Purdue 2001) the authors are skeptical of social capital, but use it in different ways, for instance Whittaker and Banwell discuss how the Australian Policy circles have adopted the concept of “social capital” as an explanatory model and the inspiration for a series of government sponsored community projects particularly those aimed at developing sustainable communities. *

Whittaker and Banwell based this article on the project sponsored by the state government health department at Brady, a small town in rural New South Wales in eastern Australia. This project aimed to improve the health and well being of residents of Brady through the introduction of various collaborative projects between the community and the government departments aimed at “community capacity building.” Goodman’s definition of community capacity was used as a starting point for the project; for him the community capacity are the characteristics of communities that affect people’s ability to identify social and public health problems and mobilize to address them.

The strategy used was to strengthen the capacity of networks and associations within the community to make them self-sufficient, so they could be healthy, strong, and sustainable communities who could provide many of their own services.

As anthropologists, Whittaker and Banwell played a role as consultants. Initially, their role was to achieve the building of community capacity at Brady by determining whether certain indicators were useful for assessing this particular community, and by developing more sensitive means of capturing the social processes and impact of the development activities. Nonetheless,
their participation was later presented by government’s bureaucrats as testing the indicators. The anthropological knowledge helped to established that indicators used may not be applicable in all communities at all times, because community is determined by its relation to “place” and “participation.” This approach tells us that indicators should be seen more as a heuristic checklist than as a means of measurement.

The anthropologists who participated in this project as consultants were not only creating an ethnographic representation about the community and place, but were actively involved in the politics of representation and construction of place and community. The checklist they were developing could act as “indicators of community capacity” for future projects in other communities. England is also a source of state-society partnerships.

In order to regenerate the inner-city neighborhoods and the peripheral estates the English government has been working in the implementation of regeneration partnerships, which include the private sector, the local governments, and the community and voluntary sector. The National Strategy for Neighborhood Renewal has the formation of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSP) as a central element in charge of conducting the process of regeneration. Theoretically speaking, the LSP will allow community leaders drawn from neighborhood-based urban social movements to gain access to elite networks, setting a pathway for community development. The case studies consisted of Single Regeneration Budget (SRB); local partnerships created to afford integrated social, economic and environmental regeneration in England.

Purdue argues that the effective regeneration of a neighborhood requires the active participation of many people who come together in partnerships to carry out innovative solutions to solve the problems of the communities. Innovative solutions require trust between the partners.
(community representatives and local authorities) and the extension of relationships of trust more widely in the neighborhood. He borrows Putnam’s ideas of bonding and bridging social capital labeling these as “collaborative” and “communal” social capital. He assumes that the success of neighborhood regeneration partnerships depends on the community leaders representing the community.

The research conducted was intended to determine whether community leaders could play an effective leadership role in their neighborhoods and in the intra and inter neighborhood partnerships. For Purdue a successful community leader pursues “communal” social capital in their connection with their supporters in the neighborhood and “collaborative” social capital by developing extra-neighborhood partnerships. The research done in nine cities demonstrates that community networks in urban neighborhoods tend to be fragmented rather than closed. Many independent small social networks may form within a given neighborhood, and they rarely interact with one another. This division within the same community is the product of a heterogeneous population. And this division inhibits the accretion of communal social capital.

The nine case studies show that the existence of partnerships does not guarantee the accumulation of social capital by community leaders, and so the regeneration of neighborhoods is in question. Furthermore, in the few cases communities could access financial capital in support of projects leaders accumulated some useful experience, but in the context of dependence on the SRB instead of mutuality. In most of the case studies power was distributed unevenly; access to decision-making, information and funds was not equally distributed among the two main partners, government and community representatives. Government usually authored the bids for partnership funding and remained the leading partners and financial
controllers of the Single Regeneration Budget scheme. The council became the one making the decisions, reducing the status of the community representatives from leaders to communicators of the Council’s decisions. Collaboration between parts was based more on power and dependence than on mutual trust; this relationship reduced the status of many leaders, they could not accumulate social capital and their constituencies felt unrepresented.

In sum, these various empirical studies contribute to our knowledge of social organization and the causes and consequences of that organization. However, few of these studies encourage the use of the term social capital, most do not defend it from criticism, and at least one reduces the ambiguity of the term by indicating its heuristic value, or by using it as a source of inspiration. In fact, the research may gain in precision from replacing the term with trust, or networks or another social characteristic believed important. As Baron and Hannan point out other scholars have investigated things these investigators label as social capital. What have we learned about social life from employing the idea of social capital? Pretty much what we knew or suspected prior; social networks can make a difference, trust is important and that these and other characteristics we think important to desirable life chances are spread unevenly across the social landscape. What have we learned about theory? Social scientists have a knack for creating concepts. But, at the end of the day we have found that social capital has not furthered researchers work on questions of interest. Research on civic participation is at an impasse (Morales diez de Ulzurrun, 2002), researchers in health seem unsure of what to do with social capital, if anything at all (Locner et. al. 1999; James et al. 2001) next, criminological work is using the idea in conjunction with other ideas, it seems that only scholars interested in organizational design, based on network models, are making headway with the idea.
Knowing how social capital is used for research it will not surprise us to know that there are many review articles on social capital, most critical of the idea, at least in part, or critical of how it has been used. But, these criticisms are useful for several reasons, which is why the next section is devoted to their review.

C.

Social capital has held the attention of many reviewers, many critical, and others seeking to articulate it with existing work in other “problems” oriented fields. Different reviewers point to different problems with the concept and the following discussion proceeds problem by problem, summarizing the criticisms offered and citing to the reviewers most associated with that critique. Authors generally find fault with or are skeptical of the idea as used by Coleman. The most obvious critique is that of Baron and Hannan who would see Coleman’s turn to economics and influence from Becker to have prompted him to “create” and use the idea. However, there are several and more direct criticisms of social capital as Coleman discussed it and as Putnam used it.

In the late 1990s generally critical reviews were the norm. Portes (1998) notes at the outset that social capital is no new idea, that our investigation of it reaches deep into the history of the social sciences but his question is, why has it caught on now and why does it have policy baggage? His answers to these questions are deceptively simple, that on the one hand social capital focuses on positive aspects of sociability, it’s not just “fun” to study, but highlights, that which is desirable about people (Woolcock expresses these ideas in a different way). From a
policy perspective “capital talk” suggests non-economic solutions to problems and this is desirable in tight budgetary times.

He is also critical of the ambiguous quality of Coleman’s definition as it opened the door for Coleman to re-label classical investigations into things like obligations, reciprocity, trust, information and appropriable organization as research into social capital. It is not clear to Portes (and others like Lochner et al, Smith and Kulynych, Edwards and Foley) that our ability to explain is enhanced. Methodologically this is a problem since many authors point out the tautology in equating social capital with the resources acquired through it. (Astone, et al, 1999) Portes points out this problem with studies in political science, Putnam for instance, that equate social capital with civic behavior. This is circular, it leads to positive outcomes, and the social capital that produces the outcomes is discerned to exist from the observing the outcome.

Other authors think social capital is a fundamentally incomplete tool that requires an interest in power and context such as discussed by Bourdieu. In this camp are Edwards and Foley, (1997) and Lopez and Stack (2001), with respect to political participation are Warren, Thompson and Saegert, (2001) whose interest is poverty. Edwards and Foley begin by noting Putnam’s rhetorical device, writing a detective story about the disappearance of social capital. Putnam asks, where did social capital go? Then he introduces suspect variables, one at a time, ignoring their cumulative affect, but also ignoring the possibility that the variables of interest are only symptomatic of larger problems. As many others they are critical of Coleman’s functional definition that makes it difficulty to separate what social capital is from what it does. Furthermore, a functional definition makes investigation somewhat more context dependent and unless done carefully, decreases the chances of reliable replication. Finally, they note that
research may be better served by focusing on context independent features like social norms or networks and the distribution of resources and the development of measures unique to understanding the problem instead of adopting other measures which are proxies at best (see Morales diez de Ulurzzun (2002) for the latest on operationalizing political participation).

Warren and his colleagues see social capital as a heuristic. They ask, what is the role of social capital in people acting together to change their lives. Social capital for them is collective, not individual, and is a resource found in trusting and cooperative relationships. It is a resource to increase and make more effective use of resources. But, in most places in their review of this edited collection, nothing is lost by deleting social capital from the discussion or replacing it with the more concrete or well-known terms for which it substitutes. For instance, in discussing the political analysis of Lopez and Stack, Warren et al write, “…more affluent Americans and dominant institutions have worked to undercut the social capital of poor communities…” This is true without question, but what is undercut is not so much social capital as the ability of poor to defend themselves or effect change on their own behalf. Lopez and Stack are themselves ambivalent in their use of social capital, making a case for acknowledging the complexity of social life and understanding the context in which behavior is observed, inclusive of social capital but it seems social capital is an add on to their argument, simply because it was their charge. Social capital has little to do with the central discussion of their chapter, understanding political inequality and resistance to power induced inequality. In summary, many authors see social capital as an incomplete tool, or at best, a heuristic.

*There are also authors who use the idea of social capital, as it is, but subordinate it within another conceptual framework (Sampson, Ferguson and Dickinson, Sampson). There is
also a camp, particularly health researchers, who use social capital as an umbrella for ideas with
more history in empirical research in their settings. Lochner et al, (1999) ask, “What are the
effects of social environment on individual health? Which ecologic characteristics matter for
health?” They accept uncritically the idea of social capital in Putnam’s terms, as density of
membership, interpersonal trust and mutual aid. But then, they go on to review how social
capital is manifested in empirical research done from the perspective of four camps in health
psychology, collective efficacy, psychological sense of community, neighborhood cohesion and
community competence. Each of these camps has its own research tradition and each is
interested in collective or ecological dimensions of health, in terms similar to social capital. But
they are also interested in context dependent variables or the relational/situational characteristics
of individuals. As an ecologic variable social capital is measured by questions like “most people
can be trusted – or you can’t be too careful in dealing with people” or “most of the time people
try to be helpful – or are they mostly looking out for themselves?” They find that this variable,
level of trust, accounts for up to .58 of the variance in total mortality across states. Levels of
trust are associated with major causes of death, like heart disease, stroke and infant mortality.
On the other hand they cite to Sampson’s work on collective efficacy as the situational or context
dependent, element of social capital. Collective efficacy requires cohesion and control, the
mutual and reciprocal influence between individuals in a place. Despite the strength of their
rhetoric at the end of the review they step back and suggest that there is much work to be done in
terms of measuring social capital collectively or situationally. Particularly they question what the
relevant unit of aggregation is and generally they question whether or not anything is added to
existing research on community cohesion by adding social capital. In terms of method they
conclude by suggesting mere systematic observation as it may yield additional insights into how social capital is formed and deployed.

Likewise James, Schulz and van Olphen (2001) discuss the relationship between social capital and health with similar concerns. They observe social capital has a variety of antecedents ideas in public health, community competence, community capacity and community empowerment and for them these analogous ideas indicate that people are thinking in similar ways about how to make their arguments, but they (like Portes) also note that there is some significant ambiguity in some of the ideas and insufficient clarity, added to academic turf fighting can impede progress in understanding social problems. They echo the concerns mentioned above, a concern with separating what social capital is from what it does, distinguish network ties from flows of information or resources. Similarly to Portes, they wish us to acknowledge that social capital is not always good, if social capital means tight networks, then it can make for in/exclusion. Finally, they are among authors, especially since Edwards and Foley in 1998, who note that the analysis of network structure or the structural features of relationships provide only a partial understanding of behavior, the rest of which is provided by the analysis of the systems of meaning that motivate relationships, desires, interests and that create habits, expectations and goals.

Yet other authors express their discontent with social capital by respecifying or reconstructing the idea. Some reconstructions are systematic, as those from network analysts and some are targeted thematically, as those directed to economic or community development. I see key among these are those involved with network analysis, which preceded social capital and to whom Coleman acknowledge for fundamental contributions to his thought; but also because
they are most responsive to the Baron and Hannan critique and concern with specificity and
relating capital to its economic roots. Separately, but in a similar vein, Astone et al (1999) and
Lin (1999) provided a reconstruction of social capital based on insights from network analysis.
They are similar in their critique, that social capital is a property of networks or individuals, not
a collective good. ...

Instead of the network analysts more complete reconstructions of social capital Woolcock
(1998) and DeFillips (2001) discuss the idea in the context of particular problems economic
development and community development. Woolcock’s purpose is to convince us that social
capital is usefully understood at the intersection of embeddedness and autonomy, the dimensions
which characterize social life. He refers to Baron and Hannan’s critique and challenges the
usage of social capital, saying that it should help people overcome static dilemmas of collective
action and dynamic organizational dilemmas. In this he is similar to some scholars who wish
social science and social capital to address prosing problems. His contribution is heuristic, by
crosstabulating high and low levels of embeddedness and autonomy he proposes that there are
four dimensions to social capital, integration (intra community ties) and linkage (extra
community networks) at the micro level and integrity (corporate coherence and capacity) and
synergy (state-society relations) at the macro level (169-70, figure 2 172) (figure 3 177)). This
“ideal type” scheme he proposes is not an explanation of economic development or how to
achieve it, rather what we get from this is his account of the important variables development
practitioners should consider.

Wallis and Dollery (2002) are also interested in social capital and local government
capacity. Local government varies in the role it plays in fomenting partnerships. What are the
factors that produce variation in this capacity? They suggest that when a government sets up some partnership it is creating social capital and can do so for many purposes. Social capital can be developed and used as an aspect of a community or as an aspect of the relationships between elements of community and government. What is in question is the state’s capacity to make a difference in community organizations and between itself and members of the community in a way that will reverberate through the community. Can the state foster community development by way of multi-organizational partnerships? Is the state ready for this role?

They suggest potential partners ask these questions and look to existing relationships between government and community to uncover the existing rules (formal and informal) of the those relationships. They also suggest that partners try to get an answer to the question: can government enforce formal rules and will they do so effectively if needed? Generally speaking they suggest potential partners try and observe government’s track record on a number of matters. For instance, if government has not set and managed coherent strategies in the past, if government lacks a track record of effective/efficient administration, if government has demonstrated the ability to mediate conflict and the goals of different interest groups while providing for participation from those groups then the potential for a constructive relationship is high. Finally, community groups should ask themselves if the political opportunity structure is open and if not, can they envision it opening from some new community government?

This laundry list of questions must be adopted to particular context as the authors leave no sense, nor could they, of floor measures of these questions, for instance answering the question, “what is effective administration?” depends on experience, context and goals. But, the questions, while posed before in other literatures remain relevant and generally speaking,
Putnam is a fatalist with regard to the potential of state-community relationships. But he does point out that state organizations can act as bridging mechanisms between community groups and Wallis and Dollery charge us with this check list of potential points to observe in empirical studies of such partnerships.

They are among many who recommend more quantitative research, they suggest that the case studies to be developed and compared (see Ragin 1992) for a discussion of the small-n comparative method). In order to comprehend and explain and make policy for community development (Foley and Edwards 1999). Wallis and Dollery see the jury as out for theoretical or policy uses of social capital in community development, they suggest we become skeptical of Putnam and they are not the only authors with this impulse.

DeFillips notes that recent community development research and practice has been dominated by social capital talk, but of the wrong kind. De Fillips is interested in reconstructing community development research and practice by criticizing Putnam’s approach (Coleman’s approach) and adopting Bourdieu and Loury’s concerns with power and context. He rehearses Portes critique and problematizes the consensual aspects of social capital research writing that conflict characterizes state-society relations and that social capital is a reification, causing analysts to reify ideas like community. In summary, these authors are interested in the intellectual antecedents of social capital, and in the case of Woolcock and De Fillips in the fit between some version of social capital and their interest in meliorating social problems. Now we will turn to some recent reviews where see little or no hope for meliorative public policy based on research with social capital and so suggest dispensing with the notion altogether.

Smith and Kulnych (2002) are authors who see no analytic use for the term social capital
and believe that the term impedes inquiry and constrains policy options and limits political
dialog. As a result they wish to dispense with the term altogether. What are the ideological and
analytic consequences of using social capital? First, it blurs analytic distinctions (Edwards and
Foley, 1992). Civic engagement is not a form of economic activity and calling class solidarity
“capital” minimizes historical context and struggle against capitalism. The referents of the term
social capital should be studied (Portes, 1998), but the term capital implies economic thinking
which can impede understanding and introduce ideological bias, i.e. encouraging people to be
social capitalists! This also impedes inquiry, suggesting that social and financial capital are
species of the same genus and so ignoring how social capital is constituted by financial capital
and how access to financial capital confers social and political advantages profoundly different
from that of social capital. Second, we shouldn’t view social capital as the precondition to
democracy and civic engagement because then we see those as a form of economic activity so
depriving them of their distinct meaning. Third, capital is associated with individualism and the
pursuit of wealth and to view civic engagement as social capital is to obscure the meaning of the
words capitalist and solidarity. Fourth using the term can obscure the historical context that
gives activity meaning. In response these authors suggest we adopt the term capacity - the
reasons for which I will not review here. Instead we should recognize that few if any reviews of
social capital are positive, and Smith and Kulynych represent the most critical discussion.

Finally, we should address one point held in common by most every author and that is
that research on social capital is incomplete until it includes an analysis of meaning and behavior
as manifested in local, comparative and/or historical understandings of context and social
processes and how meaning and behavior relate individuals and society. I will be brief in my
discussion. James et al, point out that knowing the structure of relationships does not mean one understands the social processes which produced the structure or the variety of purposes to which the structure can be put. Likewise, Edwards and Foley argue that understanding the context of activity makes meaningful behavior, the two are interdependently understood by observation. Lochner et.al. ask that we anchor our understandings and explanation to the meaning people attribute to places, relationships and activities. Sampson makes the point as well, noting that analysts infer much about the social processes that produces outcomes of interest, but little is done to understand those processes. He is among those who call for ethnographic work, close interviewing and strict attention to identifying and measuring social processes. Smith and Kulnych’s purpose is twofold, on the one hand noting that our concepts derive from our understanding of meaning and behavior, as well as the scholarly tradition the concepts are developed from (Warren Thompson and Saegert; and Woolcock make this point); but they also note the close tie between the behavioral and political assumptions of disciplinary ideas and the resultant options for policy and political practice. In effect, they argue that using social capital overly reduces the analysts interest in historical context and current complexity of social life and constrains policy options.

In sum, reviewers are interested in social capital, to various degrees, but uniformly critical of it for a variety of reasons while at the same time offering a fairly similar corrective, a strong attention to understanding meaning and behavior in particular contexts, with, I should add, falsifiable explanations of such behavior across contexts. In the section to follow our attention will turn, briefly, to a conflict in social capital theory important to revising the term is spirit, if not in fact and to developing the congruence across disciplines noted in what to add to
our studies that use social capital.

II. Conflicts in Theory and Congruence in Methodology of Social Capital Research

Smith and Kulnych (2002) are the most severely critical of social capital, but they are among those that offer a serious reformulation of the concept. Instead of Lin or Astone’s interest in networks and a respecification of social capital to integrate it more closely to economics and exchange theory, Smith and Kulnych desire a reconstruction of the idea more radically then varieties of incorporation suggested by Sampson et.al. or Lochner et.al.

Smith and Kulnych ask the question, if capital is unfriendly to politics, policy or research practice, but, if we are interested in the social processes and outcomes it has been used to explain then let us replace capital with some idea with a firmer grounding in research and philosophy and the idea they offer is capacity. In response they suggest a more contextually based vocabulary. Civic capacity is one alternative as civic refers to public activity and blurs less the difference between public and private as social capital does. Civic capacity has a group referent that social capital does not share, being more interpersonally oriented. It acknowledges that inter group cooperation is key to attaining public policy goals. Civic capacity is about developing and sustaining local political arrangements commensurate with policy changes, thus including economic and public sector players.

Besides these ideas, capacity has a strong resonance to the idea of capability, a term given much attention and development by economist Amtrya Sen and philosopher Martha Nussbaum.
The literatures seem to have in common a call for understanding meaning/process by using ethnographic or refining other methods.

III. A(nother) Practical Approach to Human Development (Edgar, here I am less confident of what you want...please make suggestions, I could tie co-prod back to lit, or do something else...)

While not a simple matter, it is none the less a readily doable job to follow the methodological criticisms discussed above and to take the idea/behavior integument seriously. Quantitative analysis of the sort produced using Rasch analysis will be useful to survey analysis of trust, reciprocity or other individual measures, be they named social capital or not. Qualitative analysis, both small N comparisons advocated by Ragin (1992) and case study methods, discussed by Ragin and Becker (1992); as well as careful ethnographic work will render understandable the most complex systems of meaning and behavior and generalize those understandings. But, no matter how useful analytic method and careful theory both are impoverished without testable and flexible policies and policy tools.

Phrased differently by different commentators social capital is attractive because embedded in it is human hope. However, hope is only embedded in social capital, the idea is too abstract for one to imagine one neighbor going to another and offering some social capital. On the other hand, there are ideas, as hopeful as social capital, but without the liability of overly abstract formulation, ideas with as deep a pedigree or even deeper and the idea of co-production is one of these. Co-production is what happens when people interact, deploying their capacities in some service to one another, in hope of realizing some benefit to themselves and if so
designed, to a greater community. It differs from social capital in that co-production is anchored
to purpose, and it differs from policy programs in that it requires no government or agency to
implement and so participants deem original purpose and design, and then proceed contingently,
as the various social processes unfold.

Once initiated a TDC is, (should be) self-organizing, like cellular automata triggered by
and following the needs, problems and opportunities uncovered by people in the club.
Communication is key. Members choose what to exchange, and eventually may choose to purse
some goal understood as part of the collective interest. This process, individuals adopting a
more public role and organizing themselves to address particular problems or in the name of
group interests is fostered by the ongoing participation in the club. Transactions provide the
capital to pay for collectively oriented activities, or the club can ‘print money’ on behalf of some
project.

When we spend money a service or good that embodies our values, needs or desires, or
that embodies a solution to a problem we have, becomes ours. Likewise for TD, exchange
embodies and evinces problems solved, values fostered and desires achieved.

Deficit arguments assume people are cultural dopes or require direction or are unable to
discern their needs, but further, these arguments fail to understand the circumstances and
experiences that make people’s choices sensible to them. Asset arguments assume people can
learn to bet on themselves and people they know. Co-production assumes self-committed
constraints, commitments are reflected in exchanges, constraints are self-organized, to the degree
broader circumstances allow, and resources to address externally manifested problems are
readily available. Co-production fosters people’s capacity to learn and deploy resources to their
own, and collective purposes.

Respect, people are disrespected for their perceived incapacities, represented as learned
disabilities (as in how to behave in situations atypical for them) and dependencies on
organizations, poor vocabularies or language skills and other ways described by a variety of
authors. TDC short circuit around these problems, not always addressing them concretely but
providing experiences that develop in the poor or otherwise “needy” a sense of self efficacy and
a collective sense of problem solving capacity. So there is the chance to transform day-to-day
habits of behavior, slowly, by this mechanism. Individuals are transformed as well, as
understood in interviews.

The reason a co-production-TD program is robust and have this variety of characteristics
is because they “bank” members good will and energy to serve later, members problems and
needs. TDC are banks, their software accounts for transactions in the same way the use of check
card is accounted for in a credit union. The analogy is not superficial. In the same way a credit
union is charted for the use of a particular group, and governed from within that group, a TDC is
constituted by a community for the uses of that community. The club admits members,
encourages involvement in, discussion of and amendment of its activities and it accounts the
transactions of the members, in the latter sense the software measures the social capital of the
TDC. Are there positive externalities that accrue to the community not directly measured? Yes,
likely.

The time bank represents community assets, fungible, to individual or community
defined problems. It also represents transactions, both one-shot and ongoing; the bank is a
measure of what people have done and, from further discussion with them, can be said is also a
measure of ideas about how they have changed and how they see themselves can emerge. People control participation, they start with experience and interest and then refine and offer what they practice. Time banks document the creation, development and deployment of assets in the service of individual, group or community projects. Asset creation is documented when a community agrees to harness exchange in the creation.

The time bank is a way to measure the production and flow of assets in a community; people serve each other, for some mission or particular purpose or in a generalized way, to fill needs as they are manifested contingently. So at the outset we recognize that as people have different time horizons, different purposes and needs, and different circumstances, communities are imperfect aggregations of these situations. New situations are constantly emerging, and people are often realizing new goals, having new problems and facing circumstances. As the people and the communities, the time bank is also an imperfect mean of aggregating and measuring social life, but in the same way a holiday savings account is a measure of a future opportunity to consume, when oriented toward some mission, the time banks’ accounting software offers the chance to relate what people do towards the completion of a mission. Furthermore, making deposits or drawing on the stored value in the service of a mission will transform how people think of themselves individually and collectively. Participation in TD will reduce the importance of thinking of themselves primarily in terms of a standard of living or in terms of market values, and will increase the importance of quality of life. As well, people will acquire a more comprehensive assessment of the context surrounding decisions, not excluding economic considerations, but rather relocating them as part of the decision making process.

So, in terms of measurement issues, in the same way a credit union is an imperfect but
valid measure of individual/community economy, in particular the transactions pursued, the TDC software is a measure of individual and household social capital. (really this is accounting, what happens is people decide what to do, what they do is in part dependent on what the group might do, but in part independent as well. There is a relationship, reciprocal, between local social organization and aspiration.) There are two measures of aggregate behavior, the first is quantitative and located in the ongoing measure provided by the accounting software, and the second is qualitative and quantitative and has to do with the missions pursed by the TDC, how they emerge as possibilities, are selected from the menu available, are designed and executed, and the subsequent changes in people’s lives which result.

In contrast to the market paradigm (core economy) where trust and predictability are minimized and hence insurance and warranties are needed to establish commitments and ongoing relationships, the time bank and the idea of co-production focus on faith and trust in a generalized way. Time dollars indicate/measure trust, and trust in non face-to-face relations, if exchanges are made then it is because there is generalized reciprocity in support of people’s needs and desires/aspirations.

Co-production cannot work without some agreement on the values underlying the design. (what is embedded in a TDC is lo information values, fungibility, in a high information environment, people have learned their way of being kin. This infusion is fostered by incentive, eventually secured by a combination of imputing the high info values to new relationships, and accepting the lo info practices thus creating generalized reciprocity, in short people see a variety of ways and others to do things with/for) All systems or activities embed values, the same activity can embed different values, for instance the different ways classrooms can be organized.
Co-production is the self-conscious embedding of values in a design, values measure in part by time dollars. Co-production will work when the organizers, and to whatever extent possible, the participants agree on the underlying values. First of all humans are all equally assets (have capacities to find, share and develop), irrespective of who they are or their life circumstances. Second, in terms of organizational capacity, co-production programs reconstruct the idea of a volunteer, reconfiguring the time devoted by some in selfless service as time they are owed for their own needs or desires. In other words, volunteerism is valued and honored as work. Currently time not counted as work is a subsidy to other institutions, as the value of housework subsidizes economic activities. Capitalism externalizes costs onto households, these externalized costs are constraints on people, constraints that are habitual but should not need to deal with. Current social service practice creates habits of dependency, clients instead of co-producers. Trust is key in these relationships.

For Cahn, the economy is either market or core and so the core encompasses non-monitized work done in families, neighborhoods and communities. Seyfang refers to Time Dollars and LETS as programs trying to change the approach to economics by creating an alternative to the traditional economy; this means by creating a secondary economy based on social networks and trust among individuals within a community. This secondary economy is also known as a social economy, because it recognizes the value of the individual’ talents and capabilities and the importance of building community through increasing self esteem, developing trust and extending networks of support to latter achieve other kinds of development.

This new economy and its possible community currency is not created as competitor of the conventional money; instead it is expected to be adopted as a complementary system to fill
the gaps where mainstream money fails to meet needs. This secondary economy, will not be created out of ashes, but will take advantage of preexisting networks and activities currently ignored and considered valueless by the market economy. Work performed traditionally by women (voluntary, caring work which performs a service to family and community) which is usually unpaid and unvalued by the market economy will become the base, a vital part of the secondary economy.

We know a lot about individual assets and about asset inventories, now how do we design institutions and organizations to foster and develop efficacious communities and individuals?

How do we avoid equating TD with wage hour? By an ethnomethodological move as seen in St. Louis where everything in the time dollar store has the same price, irrespective of item, it costs the same. This system raises arguments against time dollar, which claim that they deprive access to real dollars, depicting it as an apartheid economic system. The equality in price was established to encourage people to buy what they need secure in the knowledge that they have earned it. People decide how the goods are valued by fulfilling their needs. If there are price differences in a TD store, how does one defend the price differences? In light of the program objectives!! In light of the lived context in the populations!! Maybe 50 TD for a computer is good, maybe too little, maybe too much. And so prices can change as objectives change.

For a TD program to work, especially in its most robust self-organizing mode, in a
heterogeneous population, regular interaction between participants is required. Once co-
production begins careful observation is required, of participating individuals and of group
activities. From these observations a trajectory can be charted, one based on understanding
proximate and emergent individual goals and constraints as well as group level goals, articulated
and emergent and constraints of the local context. Understanding this complex interplay of
person, organization and place, of meaning and behavior in context, is the goal of problems
oriented researchers in a number of fields, understanding it in terms of a timedollar club is
particularly useful since the club integrates, from its inception, some initial understanding(s) of
all three.

Program objectives are key, will it start out as a community of place or a community of
mission? What is sensible, useful and closest to what the people understand? Eventually,
people may incorporate, self-organize, new missions for themselves.

Compare the measures produced in a TD club with those gathered in a social service
agency. TD measures should imply trust, network development, and change in one’s sense of
self or self-efficacy.

Co-production reframes relationships’ putting people in a new tactical situation and
legitimates them as willing and interested in own futures. Myopia is fought with TD as TD can
be used to self organize.

Co-production/TD are part of the moral economy neither market nor hierarchy and
networks are neither capital nor government, so appeals to liberals as it works for non powered
and works for anyone who values individual work ethic.

TD are a measure of any sort of co-produced activity, people can incentivize many
behaviors. People are engaged at individual level, trust, respect, honoring their work and at
collective level producing in the course of their activities an observable spirit in a place as well
as goods for a group and even shaping aspects of the agendas of organizations and government
agencies.

Co-production can begin to redress inequalities, it can build community and civic
capacity and engagement and it does so by transforming the relationship between people and
between people and their local government and organizations.

In El Paso, the idea of co-production has significant anecdotal support for supporting
health care. From there that we ask: Could time dollars help migrant workers obtain regular
health care? The primary goal in our research is to improve the health of migrant workers by
organizing them into self-supporting networks. Supporting each other will earn participants
‘time dollars’ (TD), which can then be used to acquire new health services or reduce their debt to
Centro de Salud Familiar La Fe (henceforth, La Fe) for prior medical services. The second goal
is to document the efficacy of using the TD as a mechanism by which to achieve improved
health among migrant workers. We will rely on La Fe to recruit migrant workers using its
existing case files and agricultural outreach component. Because of the trust between the migrant
worker population and La Fe’s outreach component, we expect successful recruitment to the
program.

We will use both a quantitative and qualitative component to measure the effectiveness of
using Time Dollars for moving individuals from non-regular users to regular users of health care.
We will use existing Time Dollar software to track network transactions as they occur. Because
TD are electronic nothing changes hands, rather, every hour helping another is logged into the
computer database. All transactions are tracked in the database, and will be analyzed to understand the network dynamics and services rendered.

We will also conduct interviews with the participants at the inception and conclusion of the program. The initial interview will focus on understanding their motivation for participating in the program and their expectations of the program. We will also learn about how people make health care decisions and use the various local health care organizations. The exit interview will focus on changes in how participants see themselves, each other and control over health care.

Besides, we will plan to interview a select group of migrant workers who chose not to participate in the program to ascertain reasons for their disinterest. These interviews will also learn about how those people make health care decisions and use the various local health care organizations.

In order to evaluate the effect of time dollars on the health of this population La Fe’s active clientele will be stratified along two dimensions: (A) indebtedness and (B) level of health care usage. Indebtedness is whether or not the individual owes money for medical services rendered at La Fe. This will create four distinct groups: (1) no-debt regular users of health care, (2) indebted regular users of health care, (3) no-debt non-regular users of health care, and (4) indebted non-regular users of health care. Once the active clients have been stratified along these dimensions, we will select # of households and form 1 club.

The members of the club will agree to participate in the club i.e. to provide and receive services from one another, to accumulate TD as households, and to use earned TD to acquire healthcare from La Fe. La Fe will then redeem TD for hard currency from the University of Texas at El Paso, partner institution in this research. The initial intellectual question addressed
here is the formation of trust, overcoming free riding. The hypothesis is that joining a club will facilitate trust and inhibit free-riding since people who join will learn, and perhaps modify, the values of the club as well as create and modify norms of participation. The non-random selection of individuals and households will allow us to control prior backgrounds. This presents an opportunity to examine the added value of a social organizational change, adding time dollar membership to existing social capital. Selection of background variables (class, employment status, etc) will make clearer the effects for those who join a club versus those who do not.

In addition to personal production of TD, we will keep track of club level production. Club level production of TD will reduce debt or increase credit for new services by some percentage based on “status” of club, e.g. 20% based on club achieving silver status each month, or 50% based on gold status. This obviously implies some might ‘free ride’ but it also implies some flexibility, both of which we could document. Some months some people might produce more than others, but then in this generalized reciprocity format they will get reimbursed. In effect this is a test of organizational design hypotheses, will people respond to collective incentives and how will they organize that participation in HH?

Common to these is the idea that once stimulated and started the clubs will be self organizing, varying in organization by membership and relation to environment, the two in reciprocal relationship.

Conclusion

Coleman’s vision, linking normative concerns, law and policy processes with social
theory is admirable, but his formulation of social capital and how it was applied by Putnam and others, under specifies complex behavior...

summarize major contributions of significant studies and articles to the body of knowledge under review, maintaining the focus established in the introduction. Evaluate the current “state of the art” for the body of knowledge reviewed, pointing out major methodological flaws or gaps in research, inconsistencies in theory and findings, and areas or issues pertinent to future study. Conclude by providing some insight into the relationship between the central topic of the literature review and a larger area of study such as a discipline, a scientific endeavor, or a profession.


capital and its Application in Applied Rural Research in Australia."

*Human Organization (Society for Applied Anthropology)*, vol. 61, no. 3, p. 252-261